Evolutionary game model and simulation analysis of multi-stakeholder behaviour for promoting Braille labelling on pharmaceutical packaging in China’s legal framework

Abstract

Abstract This study investigates the factors influencing the lack of Braille-embossed labels in Chinese pharmaceutical product packaging. To this end, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of multi-participant behaviour in drug production regulation and conducts simulation based on the perspective of stakeholders in order to study the evolutionary steady state of regulatory authorities, pharmaceutical companies, and visually impaired individuals and the influence of each parameter variable on the choice of strategic behaviour of the participants. The simulation results show that in the legal framework of China, administrative penalties, the production subsidy rate, and the Basic Medical Insurance (BMI) reimbursement rate are the main drivers of the system’s evolution towards a steady state. Reduced costs of drugs with Braille-embossed packaging is a prerequisite for the visually impaired to purchase such drugs, and the key for the whole system to converge to a stable state therefore lies in the BMI reimbursement rate for drugs with Braille-embossed packaging. This paper suggests that the Chinese government should improve the law enforcement mechanism for the regulation of the production of drugs with Braille-embossed packaging; increase the type and intensity of administrative penalties as well as production subsidies, tax incentives, and compliance incentives for pharmaceutical companies; and provide higher BMI reimbursement rates for the visually impaired. The results of the study provide valuable insights to improve accessibility to drugs and build a barrier-free environment for ensuring medication safety in China and other developing countries.