IEEE Access (Jan 2023)

Research on Evolutionary Traceability Decision- Making of Quality and Safety Traceability of Stakeholders: Based on the Dual Channel Supply Chain of Agricultural Products

  • Cui Li,
  • Guoping Chen

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3276984
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 11
pp. 48463 – 48479

Abstract

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Quality and Safety Traceability (QST) is an effective means of ensuring the quality and safety of agricultural products and requires the simultaneous, continuous and rapid involvement of all stakeholders in the agricultural supply chain. Therefore, we first constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of producers, supermarkets and e-commerce platforms. Second, we analysed the dynamic evolutionary process of the three players and the conditions for stable strategy choice. Finally, Matlab R2021a is used for simulation to analyse the choice of stabilisation strategies for different decision makers under changes in key parameters. The research results show that: (1) if the benefits of participating in QST exceed the spillover effects of other stakeholders in the supply chain participating in QST, all stakeholders in the dual channel agricultural supply chain will eventually voluntarily participate in QST. (2) With the same initial intention, supermarkets/e-commerce platforms reach equilibrium and stability earlier than producers. The stronger the initial willingness of stakeholders to participate, the shorter the time it takes to reach equilibrium and stability. (3) The higher the traceability cost-benefit conversion rate of producers/supermarkets/e-commerce platforms, the faster they can participate in QST. However, the higher the traceability cost-benefit conversion rate of supermarkets/e-commerce platforms, the faster the supermarkets/e-commerce platforms can participate in QST and the slower the producers can participate in QST. (4) The lower the spillover benefits received by stakeholders, the faster they participate in QST. However, at the same level of spillovers, the more stakeholders participate in QST, the slower the speed at which producers, supermarkets and e-commerce platforms participate in QST. Based on evolutionary game analysis and simulation results, we propose suggestions for producers, supermarkets and e-commerce platforms to participate in QST simultaneously, continuously and rapidly in stages.

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