Fiction, existence et référence

Abstract

The Amie Thomasson’s paper continues to explore the thesis she developed in Fiction and Metaphysics about the problems of reference. More precisely, the issues are about the problems that a realistic view of abstract objects can encounter. Here, the question has to be written in a particular way: if there are fictional characters, why do we quite naturally say that such or such character doesn’t exist? How can a realist overthrow such difficulties explaining the claims of non-existence can be true when we are for such a view? The author presents three approaches of these claims: the restricted quantification approach, the metalinguistic approach and finally the application conditions approach. The first approach is about spatial and categorical restrictions in order to outline the field the reference is applied. The second approach is the way the direct reference theorists choose. The strategy consists in using the metalanguage that is to say to pass by a higher semantic level. The last approach which is the condition application approach is constructed with the virtues of the previous approaches. Finally, the author will show how the last view can be used for the metaphysics discussions.

Keywords

• abstract artefact
• artefactual thory
• fiction
• affect
• beauty
• cartesianism