Strategy To Assess Zoonotic Potential Reveals Low Risk Posed by SARS-Related Coronaviruses from Bat and Pangolin
Yong Yang,
Xu-Rui Shen,
Yu-Lan Zhang,
Ren-di Jiang,
Xi Wang,
Zhen-Qiong Guan,
Qian Li,
Yu-Lin Yao,
Qian-chun Gong,
Rong Geng,
Qi Wang,
Yan Zhu,
Jing-Yi Luo,
Zheng-Li Shi,
Hui-lan Zhang,
Ke Peng,
Peng Zhou
Affiliations
Yong Yang
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Xu-Rui Shen
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Yu-Lan Zhang
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Ren-di Jiang
State Key Laboratory of Genetic Engineering, School of Life Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Xi Wang
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Zhen-Qiong Guan
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Qian Li
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Yu-Lin Yao
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Qian-chun Gong
State Key Laboratory of Genetic Engineering, School of Life Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Rong Geng
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Qi Wang
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Yan Zhu
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Jing-Yi Luo
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Zheng-Li Shi
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Hui-lan Zhang
NHC Key Laboratory of Respiratory Diseases, Department of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, Tongji Hospital, Tongji Medical College, Huazhong University of Sciences and Technology, Wuhan, China
Ke Peng
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Peng Zhou
CAS Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and State Key Laboratory of Virology, Center for Antiviral Research, Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Wuhan, Hubei, China
ABSTRACT In the last 2 decades, pathogens originating in animals may have triggered three coronavirus pandemics, including the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Thus, evaluation of the spillover risk of animal severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-related coronavirus (SARSr-CoV) is important in the context of future disease preparedness. However, there is no analytical framework to assess the spillover risk of SARSr-CoVs, which cannot be determined by sequence analysis alone. Here, we established an integrity framework to evaluate the spillover risk of an animal SARSr-CoV by testing how viruses break through key human immune barriers, including viral cell tropism, replication dynamics, interferon signaling, inflammation, and adaptive immune barriers, using human ex vivo lung tissues, human airway and nasal organoids, and human lung cells. Using this framework, we showed that the two pre-emergent animal SARSr-CoVs, bat BtCoV-WIV1 and pangolin PCoV-GX, shared similar cell tropism but exhibited less replicative fitness in the human nasal cavity or airway than did SARS-CoV-2. Furthermore, these viruses triggered fewer proinflammatory responses and less cell death, yet showed interferon antagonist activity and the ability to partially escape adaptive immune barriers to SARS-CoV-2. Collectively, these animal viruses did not fully adapt to spread or cause severe diseases, thus causing successful zoonoses in humans. We believe that this experimental framework provides a path to identifying animal coronaviruses with the potential to cause future zoonoses. IMPORTANCE Evaluation of the zoonotic risk of animal SARSr-CoVs is important for future disease preparedness. However, there are misconceptions regarding the risk of animal viruses. For example, an animal SARSr-CoV could readily infect humans. Alternately, human receptor usage may result in spillover risk. Here, we established an analytical framework to assess the zoonotic risk of SARSr-CoV by testing a series of virus-host interaction profiles. Our data showed that the pre-emergent bat BtCoV-WIV1 and pangolin PCoV-GX were less adapted to humans than SARS-CoV-2 was, suggesting that it may be extremely rare for animal SARSr-CoVs to break all bottlenecks and cause successful zoonoses.