Changes in repo markets and the necessity for CCPs in Korea

Abstract

In 2022, US financial regulators proposed to mandate a single central clearing mechanism for treasury bonds and repo transactions to stabilize financial markets. The systemic risks inherent in repo markets were first highlighted by the global financial crisis and, as a response, global financial authorities such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have advocated for the introduction of a central counterparty (CCP). This study examines the structural characteristics of Korean repo markets and proposes the introduction of CCPs as a way to mitigate systemic risk. To this end, the author analyzes the structural differences between US and European repo markets and estimates the potential consequences of introducing CCP clearing in local repo markets. In general, CCPs offer two benefits: they can reduce required capital through netting in multilateral transactions, and they can mitigate the effects of risk transfer by isolating counterparty risk during periods of turbulence. In Korea, the latter effect is expected to play a pivotal role in mitigating potential risks.

Keywords

• Repo (repurchase agreement)
• CCP (central counterparty)
• Systemic risk