Plato, Identity, and Virtue

Abstract

A common understanding of identity is a logical principle with the formula A is A. In this understanding, identity is a principle which lacks dimension, and epistemic and existential meaning; therefore, with regard to this principle, nothing can be something else. In Greek thought, it was supposed to be the feature which helped understand existence. Identity has an important place in Plato’s thought that tries to establish a new society based on philosophic thinking and considers this rational thinking to be a virtue which attempts to reach a good idea. Hence, the predicate in Socratic proposition “virtue is knowledge” is only possible (something like virtue can be something else like knowledge) if identity is not considered as sameness but considered as a property which forms the essence of the creatures. Therefore, Plato should distinguish between sameness and identity. Ignoring this difference leads to misunderstanding Plato’s most important doctrine that is the ideas and their relation with each other (and with their instances). This article has tried to show: a) what is the relation between the proposition “virtue is knowledge” and identity; b) what is Plato’s understanding of identity which let something be something else without being paradoxical with “being the same as something else”.

Keywords

• sameness
• identity
• virtue
• Plato