Tu quoque Defense from the Perspective of the Practice of International Criminal Co

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this paper is to consider the Tu quoque defence in the context of international criminal law by the analytical-descriptive approach. Simply put, Tu quoque is the Latin term (equal to: You too) and often is stated in this context: (You should not punish me because you did it too). This defence, for the first time was implicitly accepted during the Nuremberg tribunal (following World War II) in the Admiral Karl Doenitz case. The original base of this argument is the clean hands doctrine: (if one of the parties of armed conflict has committed certain crimes, his hands to prosecute or punish other parties of conflict for the same crimes are not clean). Recently, criminal tribunals such as International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia have been faced with Tu quoque as a defence. Despite the existence of an ambiguous history for this defence, jurists have not paid enough attention to this defence. This paper, by examining the jurisprudence of IMT and other international criminal courts, concludes that Tu quoque defence in Genocide and Crimes against humanity cannot be accepted, but in some War Crimes and the Crime of Aggression, this defence is acceptable under certain circumstances.

Keywords

• tu quoque
• reprisal
• clean hands doctrine
• international criminal law
• international jurisprudence