An Essay on Heideggerian Realism

Abstract

The paper is devoted to discussing the question of whether Heidegger is a realist or anti-realist. In the first section, I try to show that Anglo-American proponents of Heidegger are divided into three camps: the first camp characterizes him as a realist, the second describes his philosophy as idealism, and the third camp inclines to say that Heidegger is neither realist nor idealist. Focusing on the robust realism pursued by Dreyfus and Spinoza in the second section, I discuss two arguments they present in favor of the robust version of Heidegger’s realism. The first argument, called the multiple world argument, is inspired by a Kantian insight, and the second argument is based on a phenomenological observation. In the third section, I examine critics’ objections to these arguments. I particularly discuss Wrathall, Malpas, and Rorty’s criticisms and show which of them is on the right track. I conclude that there are good reasons to doubt that Dreyfus and Spinoza’s robust realism would be a plausible philosophical account and an authentic interpretation of Heidegger.

Keywords

• heidegger
• dreyfus
• robust realism