International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems (Aug 2024)
A Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanism and discharge guidance strategy for private electric vehicles for distribution systems load restoration
Abstract
Effectively utilizing large-scale Private Electric Vehicles (PREVs) in load restoration can enhance the capability of Distribution System Operators (DSOs) to respond to accidental power outages. However, the challenge remains in incentivizing and guiding PREVs to participate in load restoration. This paper proposes a Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanism, with a V2G Station Operator (VSO) discharge guidance model based on the Huff attraction model embedded to address this challenge. The VSO is introduced to manage the issue of PREVs having small individual capacities, and not meeting the criteria for direct participation in electricity markets. Firstly, a framework for involving PREVs in load restoration is introduced, clarifying the responsibilities of PREVs, VSO, DSO, and Distribution Market Operator (DMO), as well as the interrelation of incentive mechanism and discharge guidance strategy. Secondly, models for each game participant are established. The VSO encapsulates the discharge guidance strategy into an optimization model using the Huff attraction-based model that captures the destination choice probabilities of PREVs, and the DSO develops a load restoration model. Thirdly, a Stackelberg game model is established with the DMO as the leader and VSO and DSO as followers. The existence and uniqueness of the proposed Stackelberg game’s equilibrium solution are proven, and a distributed iterative algorithm is employed for the solution. Finally, numerical simulations are performed with the IEEE 33-bus distribution system and a simplified road network to validate the proposed strategy’s effectiveness in guiding PREVs’ participation in load restoration, enhancing the restoration capability of the DSO, and improving the economic efficiency of each participant.