A Certificateless Two-party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol under the Lippold Security Model

Abstract

Purposes By analyzing the session partial key disclosure camouflage attack (P-KCI) in Lippold security model, it is found that the existing certificateless key agreement protocols have security defects that they can’t resist the P-KCI attack. Methods In this paper, eight different key combination disclosure attacks of session partial key disclosure camouflage attack in Lippold security model are summarized. Besides, the security defects of existing certificateless key agreement protocols are analyzed by using these attacks. Findings A secure and efficient pairing-free CT-AKA protocol that can perfectly resist P-KCI attack is proposed, and its security is analyzed in an extended extended-Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK) model. Conclusions Compared with other existing similar protocols, the proposed protocol is more secure, and the calculated loss is reduced by 28.4%.

Keywords

• certificate-less
• pairing-free
• authenticated key agreement
• session partial key compromise impersonation attack (p-kci)
• lippold security model
• extended-canetti-krawczyk model(eck)