Contesting coercion: U.S.-China strategic competition, the middle technology trap, and Chinese government-guided funds

Abstract

Abstract This study examines the possible emergence of a Middle Technology Trap (MTT) in U.S.-China strategic competition through the lens of the Global Financial Network (GFN) and the Global Innovation Network (GIN). By conducting doctrinal analysis, theoretically informed case studies, and in-depth interviews, we offer a granular study into how the U.S. has been weaponizing its leading position in the GFN to affect China’s level of participation in the GIN. Our findings reveal three U.S. tactics to induce the MTT with China: first, leveraging U.S. private equity and venture capital (PEVC) to enhance its technology advantage over China; second, pushing U.S. investors to withdraw from China’s PEVC market, thereby restricting Chinese access to American capital; and third, inducing Advanced Business Services (ABS) supporting innovation and global business to cease or reduce their operations in China, thereby increasing intermediation costs for innovation. Although Chinese government-guided funds (GGFs) have managed to partially mitigate the “funding gap” from the departure of American PEVCs, they have yet to assume the brokerage role previously played by American PEVCs in both the GIF and the GIN. As such, our study contributes to a better understanding and theoretical advancements of the MTT by linking up the scholarship of innovation and finance with financial statecraft.

Keywords

• U.S.-China strategic competition
• Government-guided fund
• Middle technology trap
• Global financial network
• Global innovation network