Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea (Aug 2021)

On Ur-intentionality

  • Ludovic Soutif,
  • Carlos Márquez

DOI
https://doi.org/10.26512/rfmc.v9i2.42920
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 9, no. 2
pp. 79 – 99

Abstract

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Starting from Brentano’s classical characterization of intentionality, we review the radical enactivist proposal about basic cognition and show that the underlying assumption that stripping teleosemantics of its representationalist commitments results in no explanatory loss is unwarranted. Significant features of basic cognition are lost, or so we argue, with the RECtification of teleosemantics that are retrieved by means of an alternative dubbed metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism.

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