Temporality of Consciousness and Historicity of Consciousness: Husserl’s Withdrawal of Transcendental Project

Abstract

n this essay through a brief sketch of Husserl’s thesis about time-consciousness, especially concentrating on its third level, it has been argued that a turn has been taken during his last reflections on time published in the C-Manuskripte in his phenomenology in general and his phenomenology of time in particular. That is to say, by holding the view that the absolute consciousness is temporal character and denying his earlier conception of a non-temporal point for consciousness as keystone of philosophy as a rigorous science, has abandoned three decades of seeking to founding transcendental philosophy; and indeed his dream of philosophy as a rigorous science is over. Therefore, the philosophical tradition that had begun with Descartes and aimed to base the edifice of knowledge on the rigorous, undoubtable and unchangeable ground, comes to end in Husserl’s phenomenology, its last heir, and thus clears the way for the appearance of a new version of phenomenology in the works of the frequent thinkers of this movement.

Keywords

• consciousness
• Transcendental Project
• Husserl’s phenomenology