Max Scheler and the Objectivity of Goodness: Towards a Phenomenology of Value

Abstract

An analogy between goodness and color is often drawn since George Edward Moore to demonstrate the objective validity of goodness, and this way has elicited many responses. German philosopher Max Scheler also frequently analogizes goodness to color. However, his theory of the good distinguishes two approaches to claim for objective validity under the framework of fact and value, and is thus based on value theory: the goods are based on the qualities of values, while what is morally good is based on material value. From the perspective of phenomenology of value, Scheler traces the former approach back to the latter. This paper analytically exposes the reasons, progress, and problems of Scheler’s grounding of the objective validity of goodness in value theory, and endeavors to clarify some misunderstandings of Scheler’s conception of value in contemporary phenomenological research, as well as to highlight the intrinsic correlation of his phenomenology of value with the good life.

Keywords

• Max Scheler
• goodness
• value
• phenomenology