Rättrådig kärlek. En etik för kärleksrelationer

Abstract

Love relations have, sometimes, been assumed to pose problems for ethics. Love relations often imply the favouring of some persons. When it is assumed that the ethical point of view should be impartial and favour no one and/or that impartiality is a condition for justice, it may seem as if love and justice/ethics place conflicting demands on us. The dividing-line between love and justice is mirrored in scholarly work on the moral meaning of the close relations with others (such as different kinds of family relations). These relations have often either been conceived in terms of love or in terms of justice. Some have also emphasised the need for a combination perspectives of justice and love, but few efforts have been made to clarify in detail how these perspectives can be combined. The theologian Margaret A Farley’s work is an exception to this tendency. This article examines her conception of just love. The aim of this paper is to present arguments for the benefit of just love as an analytic tool in the analysis of that which takes place in love relations. I will elaborate two criteria that need to be met in order for love to qualify as just. I will also apply the discussion of just love to live kidney donation cases where the potential donor(s) and the recipient are engaged in a love relation.