Studia Gilsoniana (Jun 2022)

The Issue of Intentionality in Contemporary Thomism

  • Alvaro Freile

DOI
https://doi.org/10.26385/SG.110208
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 11, no. 2
pp. 207 – 228

Abstract

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The issue of intentionality is one of the pivotal points in the theory of knowledge. Depending on how intentionality is understood, one can be a realist, a nominalist, or an idealist. For that reason, modern Thomists widely discuss this theme. The four different positions in this debate are: the first three, which are considered reductive views are: “identity view of representationalism,” “direct realism,” and “similarity theory.” The fourth is considered a non-reductive view and can be called primitive intentionality theory. The paper concludes that the most adequate way to understand intentionality is a non-reductive view, not exactly the same as the “primitive intentionality theory,” but rather a view that considers esse intentionale as a metaphysical mode of being which solves the question of the existence of known objects.

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