Perdre la vie. Vers une biologie privative

Abstract

Loosing Life. Towards a privative Biology In what sense can we speak about life? In what sense can we speak about life in itself, without adopting neither vitalism nor reductionism? Both of these approaches, in fact, fail in the attempt to understand life because they are grounded on a physical – and dualistic – model. On the contrary, life has to be understood as a phenomenon and through the experience of the living being: namely, through phenomenology. In this article, I present the principal steps of a privative biology. By recognising an ontological belonging to the world (hyper-appartenance), a primordial movement (archi-mouvement), that is to say an original life (archi-vie) and, finally, an insurmountable separation from the world (archi-événement), it follows that a being is living only in the way of movement and only in the attempt to go back to the original dynamism from which it stems. In other words, it is desire.

Keywords

• biology
• phenomenology
• vitalism
• reductionism