Evolutionary game of cooperative behavior among social capitals in PPP projects: A complex network perspective

Abstract

The relationship among social capitals is more complex in PPP projects, it is of great significance to clarify the evolutionary mechanism of cooperative behavior among them. The paper explores the evolutionary trend of social capitals’ cooperative behavior under different influences. It is found default penalty is positively related to the evolutionary of social capitals’ cooperative behavior; But the effect of network density is exactly the opposite; Under certain limits, initial cooperation probability has a positive effect on the emergence of cooperation; In addition, network size has different sensitivities to default penalty and network density. The larger the network size is, the stronger the sensitivity to default penalty; The opposite is true for network density. The research results will enrich the research perspective of social capitals’ cooperative behavior evolutionary and help to provide a new idea for promoting long-term stable cooperation between social capitals and improving the efficiency of PPP projects.

Keywords

• PPP
• Social capital
• Complex network
• Cooperative behavior
• Evolutionary game