Differential Game Model of Distributed Energy Sharing in Industrial Clusters Based on the Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

Abstract

The sharing economy is a new economic model that can promote the optimal allocation of resources. Distributed energy sharing in the industrial cluster is of great significance for cluster enterprises to improve energy utilization efficiency and reduce carbon emissions. In this paper, we establish a differential game model for energy sharing in the industrial cluster under the cap-and-trade mechanism analyze the equilibrium strategies of core and supporting enterprises in the industrial cluster under three different decision scenarios. We then conduct a comparative analysis of the results, and the effect of the carbon cap and carbon trading prices on energy sharing in the industrial cluster is discussed in detail. Finally, the results of the theoretical analysis were verified through numerical simulations. The conclusions are as follows: 1) The energy sharing synergy, profit for both parties, and total system profit are the highest under the centralized decision, the Stackelberg game is better than the decentralized decision, and the cost-sharing contract can achieve the overall coordination of interests; 2) A higher carbon trading price can increase the low-carbon level of energy consumption, but interestingly, when the carbon cap is below a certain limit, the increase in carbon trading price within a certain time and interval will lead to a decrease in profits for both parties and total system profit; 3) In the Stackelberg game scenario where cost-sharing contracts are introduced, the cost-sharing ratio of core enterprises will increase as the proportion of benefits to core enterprises increases and government subsidies to supporting enterprises decrease.

Keywords

• Cap-and-trade mechanism
• industrial cluster
• energy sharing
• cost-sharing contract
• differential game