Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder People

Abstract

With the background of aging, ensuring the deep integration of pension and medical services and effectively integrating pension resources and medical resources are hot issues that must be addressed in the current mode of integrating health and care services for older people. Thus, we use game theory to construct the utility model of resource allocation between pension and medical institutions. We apply this model to explore how pension institutions and medical institutions invest resources into the integration of health and care services, analysis of influencing factors, and conducting incentive mechanism research by using MATLAB 2016b software. Through theoretical deduction and experimental analysis, the following conclusions are drawn. First, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with the level of labor input, and its growth rate has a marginal diminishing effect on the level of labor. Second, in early investment, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with fixed asset investment regardless of the different effort coefficients between medical institutions and pension institutions. With a high income distribution coefficient, pension institutions are negatively correlated and marginally decrease. Third, in early investment, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with medical institutions’ labor input level. When the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions reaches a certain value, it is negatively correlated with the labor input level of medical institutions, thereby showing a marginal diminishing effect.