Acquiescing to intuition in individuals prone to delusions: alterations in dual processes and cognitive control

Abstract

Abstract Anomalous beliefs exist on a continuum ranging from conventional beliefs to delusions. Recent work proposes that delusions may be formed via acquiescence, in which intuitive beliefs arise and persist despite awareness that they conflict with rationality. Cognitive control theory can similarly explain how we fail to detect that delusional beliefs conflict with rationality, and/or marshal cognitive control (analytic) resources to override them. We measured intuitive processes using a decision-making task and analytic processes using Stroop and cognitive reflection (CRT) tasks. Stronger intuition and lower CRT/Stroop scores were associated with acquiescence. Importantly, those less prone to delusions were more likely to override their intuition as their analytic strength increased; however, for more delusion-prone participants, analytic strength predicted an increased likelihood of acquiescence. Findings highlight an interactive role of intuitive and analytic processes in anomalous beliefs, including delusions, such that cognitive resources may be rallied to rationalize intuitions.