Justification of atemporal values in Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects

Abstract

In the history of philosophy, Alexius Meinong’s interest in axiology has traditionally been seen as confined to his earlier works. However, if we analyze his writing after 1917, in which Meinong discusses timeless values, it becomes clear that he became increasingly disinterested in psychology. Moreover, since the theory of the object, in Meinong’s view, could not be a part of metaphysics, he had to deal with the additional methodological difficulty of proving that the good exists independently of human subjectivity. The article discusses A. Meinong’s understanding of the object of desire, the object of a value-feeling and the connection between ethical values as objects of consciousness and time. It is shown that, according to Meinong, language is where values actually reside and only through language can their reality be explained.

Keywords

• meinong’s value theory
• subject of desire
• subject of axiological feelings
• existence of absolute values
• psychologism