Institutional directors, central bank-approved directors, partner-client tenure and audit reporting timeliness

Abstract

AbstractFollowing the lead of recent literature showing the vital role played by institutional directors in influencing organizational outcomes, this study contributes to the body of research on auditing delays by examining the question of if and to what extent institutional directors have any connection to the on-time completion of audit reports. The study also looks into how having directors who have been approved by the central bank can speed up audit reporting. In addition, the research article goes on to explore concerns regarding the potential negative effects that changing partners could have on auditing results due to the impairment of client-specific knowledge. Our study provides pioneering empirical evidence supporting the idea that institutional directors and financial institution directors significantly improve audit timeliness in emerging audit economies. Furthermore, this study finds little evidence to support the contention that a long-tenured audit partner improves financial reporting timeliness. Therefore, being scared of mandatory partner rotation leads to an impairment of knowledge and understanding specific to customers, and the postponement of declarations of audited financial results is unwarranted and unnecessary.

Keywords

• institutional directors
• board composition
• auditor rotation
• partner tenure
• audit lag