Evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral

Abstract

In recent years, China has been promoting the process of carbon neutral by establishing carbon exchanges (CEs) and implementing relevant carbon emission reward and punishment policies. This study proposes a partnership of the CE, solar power plant (SPP) and coal-fired thermal power plant (TPP). Based on the tripartite evolutionary game model and current policies of China, the evolutionary processes are simulated and discussed. The results reveal that stable states can be achieved under different partnership modes. Effect evaluation results of typical parameters on the three participants show that on the premise of ensuring the participations of CE and SPP, properly reducing the prices of carbon emission share sold to the TPP will strengthen the participation willingness of TPP. The relatively reasonable selling price ranges of carbon emission share of the CE and SPP sold to the TPP are 6.0∼6.2 $/t and 5.3∼5.5 $/t, respectively. Higher zero carbon emission reward and higher carbon tax can strengthen the participation willingness of TPP and make the TPP achieve the carbon neutral. This study can provide a reference for the government and related industries to promote the carbon neutral development as well as the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power.

Keywords

• Solar power plant
• Coal-fired thermal power plant
• Carbon emission reduction
• Carbon neutral
• Carbon trading