A time-delayed evolutionary game analysis of new energy vehicles development considering subsidy and carbon tax

Abstract

With economic and social development, the transport sector is growing rapidly, leading to a surge in energy consumption and environmental degradation. New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) are regarded as an important tool to alleviate energy and environmental issues, but the market share of NEVs in China is low, and how to increase the market share of NEVs is an urgent issue. This study constructs an evolutionary game model between local governments and automakers to explore the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of both under different combinations of subsidy and carbon tax, aiming to find rational policies to promote the development of the NEVs. Considering the possible delay effect of the game process, a time-delayed differential equation is established to analyze the effects of random time delay on the stability of the system. Finally, a numerical simulation is carried out to obtain the following conclusions: constant subsidy and carbon tax policy is not conducive to the proliferation of NEVs, variable subsidy and carbon tax policy is effective in the short term, and variable subsidy and constant carbon tax policy is effective in the long term; strengthening the entry of carbon tax can help to develop the NEVs industry; the initial value will affect the evolution of system under constant policy; excessive time delay can cause the system to lose its original stability.

Keywords

• Evolutionary game model
• Random time delay
• New energy vehicles
• Subsidy and carbon tax