Beat the Heat: Syscall Attack Detection via Thermal Side Channel

Abstract

As the complexity and integration of electronic devices increase, understanding and mitigating side-channel vulnerabilities will remain a critical area of cybersecurity research. The new and intriguing software-based thermal side-channel attacks and countermeasures use thermal emissions from a device to extract or defend sensitive information, by reading information from the built-in thermal sensors via software. This work extends the Hot-n-Cold anomaly detection technique, applying it in circumstances much closer to the real-world computational environments by detecting irregularities in the Linux command behavior through CPU temperature monitoring. The novelty of this approach lies in the introduction of five types of noise across the CPU, including moving files, performing extended math computations, playing songs, and browsing the web while the attack detector is running. We employed Hot-n-Cold to monitor core temperatures on three types of CPUs utilizing two commonly used Linux terminal commands, ls and chmod. The results show a high correlation, approaching 0.96, between the original Linux command and a crafted command, augmented with vulnerable system calls. Additionally, a Machine Learning algorithm was used to classify whether a thermal trace is augmented or not, with an accuracy of up to 88%. This research demonstrates the potential for detecting attacks through thermal sensors even when there are different types of noise in the CPU, simulating a real-world scenario.

Keywords

• Linux OS
• thermal sensors
• syscalls
• side channels
• security