Must Phenomenology be Transcendental?

Abstract

An example of criticism of the transcendental character of phenomenology from within the phenomenological movement has recently been presented by Claude Romano. I argue against Romano’s criticism. The first section is devoted to the claim that the Cartesian character of early Husserlian phenomenology and its transcendental turn resulted from taking scepticism seriously. According to Romano, the reasons that force phenomenology to be a transcendental philosophy can be rejected. Moreover, a transcendental phenomenology is already impossible because of the incompatibility of the basic phenomenological theses: Realism, dualism and transcendentalism. The second section demonstrates how these seemingly incompatible theses together make a transcendental phenomenology possible. The third section deals with the universal epoché beyond the idea of a limited epoché on which Romano’s critique of transcendental phenomenology is based. The fourth chapter argues that Husserl’s main interest in scepticism has to do with the historical role assigned to scepticism, depending on the original idea of philosophy as universal, rigorous and first science. The fifth section demonstrates that transcendental phenomenology is the only genuine philosophy capable of realising this idea of philosophy by overcoming scepticism. In conclusion, I argue that phenomenology’s originality depends on its transcendental nature, as long as it is understood as a position that investigates the conditions of possibility of being and knowledge of objects in the face of all forms of objectivism.

Keywords

• transcendental phenomenology
• claude romano
• husserl
• cartesianism
• scepticism