Entre San Agustín y Pelagio: Molina y la necesidad moral del pecado

Abstract

The Council of Trent put forward the Augustinian claim that it is impossible for man to avoid all sins during a lapse of time. This dogma is hardly compatible with the Council’s definition of freedom as a power not to consent to sin. Here Molina’s own account is examined, relying on S. Knebel’s work. According to him, it is morally necessary that every man commit at least one sin during some lapse of time, but —and this is Molina’s main innovation— such a necessity amounts to no more than a statistical regularity, which is perfectly consistent with man’s power to avoid sinning on any particular occasion. In spite of an apparent agreement with Augustine, this solution lends indeed much more toward Pelagianism.

Keywords

• Augustin saint
• fatalisme statistique
• libre arbitre
• Molina Luis de
• nécessité morale
• péché