Argumentation et Analyse du Discours (Sep 2008)
Pour une éthique du discours : prise de position et rationalité axiologique
Abstract
This article is situated at the crossroads of Discourse Analysis, Argumentative Rhetoric and the philosophical concept of Ethics. It aims at raising the problems inherent to the issue of discursive positioning. It will attempt to reexamine this notion through the prism of the argumentative concept of judgment or discursive stand, in order to contribute to a conceptualization of the notion of an Ethics of discourse. This paper attempts to answer epistemological questions such as: 1) why does taking a stand in public imply that the speakers recur, in numerous genres of discourse, and even if the genre does not require it, to erasing any trace of discursive subjectivity, thus making opinions appear as judgments of fact? 2) Why is it still necessary today to remind linguists that the lexicon of a language contains a myriad of subjective axiological terms and that questions such as “what does X think about this? Is he for or against it? Does he like it or not?” constitute spontaneous inescapable reactions to the words of others? Lastly, why would a discourse analyst preoccupied by referential truth, but similarly by “ethical rectitude” and axiological rationality, have to turn to a theory of argumentation in order to deal with the ins and outs of judging ? This article starts with a presentation of a theoretical frame dealing with the necessity to take into account not only referential truth, but also and in close relation to it, of value judgments and axiological rationality. The coexistence between the speaker’s discursive responsibility and his argumentative responsibility, and the coexistence of the issues of “referential truth” and “ethical rectitude”, should be considered jointly. Three case studies will then allow us to move from theory to practice. The first two cases deal with the rhetoric of the written press, analyzing first the deontological concept of “neutral commitment” and then a fundamental journalistic rhythm: the static oscillation between two opposing poles. The third and last example illustrates the controversial question of the linguist’s neutrality. Most scholars subscribe to the deontological axiom of non-intervention, thus presupposing that neutrality is linguistically and discursively possible, although simultaneously affirming that enunciative subjectivity is inescapable.
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