Mit i mity w filozofii Paula Feyerabenda

Abstract

This paper explores the usage of the concept of myth in Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. First three parts of the paper are devoted to analysis of lectures in which Feyerabend, following Karl Popper, contrasts two philosophical attitudes: mythical dogmatism and criticism of pre-socratics. The next two parts cover Popper’s and Feyerabend’s anti-dogmatic remedies – criticism and humanism. It is shown that, although their critiques of the dogmatic form of life bear many similarities, they differ substantially on the axiological level. While Popper considers rational criticism to be the best way of opposing dangerous myths, Feyerabend uses critical rationalism as a tool that may serve this function but is not effective universally. The final part of the paper shows how Feyerabend’s usage of the concept of myth shifted in his late, more pluralistic and pragmatic works, where he regarded every human practice as a form of nature- and value-dependent myth.

Keywords

• Feyerabend
• Popper
• myth
• dogmatism
• criticism
• humanism