Local government centralization and corporate ESG performance: Evidence from China’s county-to-district reform

Abstract

As a city–county consolidation with Chinese characteristics, China’s county-to-district (CtD) reform transfers a county’s autonomy to a city, thereby strengthening the administrative, decision-making, fiscal and other powers of the prefecture-level municipal government, which effectively enables the centralization of local governments. Based on this exogenous quasi-natural experiment, we use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to empirically examine the impact of prefecture-level municipal government centralization on companies’ ESG performance. The results show that municipal government centralization can significantly promote corporate ESG performance, which represents environmental protection, social responsibility and corporate governance behavior. The mechanism analysis also shows that the CtD reform can address market segmentation, alleviate policy uncertainty and reduce rent-seeking, which further improves ESG performance.

Keywords

• Municipal government centralization
• County-to-district reform
• ESG
• Market segmentation
• Policy uncertainty
• Rent-seeking