Critique of Three Gödelian Arguments in Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

Some philosophers apply Gödel incompleteness theorems to show that modeling the mind by means of a machine is not possible. Arguments based on these theorems are called Gödelian arguments in philosophy of mind. In this article, we want to criticize three Gödelian arguments. These arguments have been presented, respectively, by Rudy Rucker, John Randolph Lucas and Roger Penrose. We try to show that: (a) some parts of Rucker’s argument are and some other parts of it are not sound; (b) Lucas' argument is absolutely failed; and (c) some parts of Penrose’s argument are sound and some other parts of it are doubtful.

Keywords

• mind-machine identity
• formal system
• gödel theorem
• gödelian arguments
• rudy rucker
• john randolph lucas and roger