A PLEA FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A GENERAL ECONOMIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

Abstract

The importance of trade negotiations involving countries or groups of countries (international trade and diplomatic negotiations) is growing. At the same time, these trade negotiations between countries or groups of countries, which may take place in bilateral, regional or multilateral fora, are increasingly difficult to conclude. Over and above their complexity (an obvious source of these difficulties), the question arises as to the relevance of the theoretical analytical framework (in the economic sense) of these phenomena. Based on a political economy analysis, this work argues for the construction of a general economic theory of international trade and diplomatic negotiations to make the players involved in this type of negotiation more effective. Firstly, beyond the difficulties in defining the concept of negotiation, international trade negotiations between countries or groups of countries are distinct from other types of negotiation (taken as a whole). Secondly, they have sufficiently specific characteristics to distinguish them from other types of trade negotiation. Finally, they satisfy the three main basic conditions defined by Arena (2020), which must be met by any phenomenon that can be the subject of pure economic theory. From this point of view, it may be relevant to understand them as a collective decision-making process in a situation of uncertainty with a view to liberalising trade.

Keywords

• international trade negotiations
• international trade regimes
• collective decision-making process
• pure economic theory
• situations of uncertainty