Selhání základem morálních teorií?: k dialektické metaetice Michaela Steinmanna

Abstract

This article is dedicated to the book Reframing Ethics through Dialectics: A New Understanding of the Moral Good by Michael Steinmann, who argues that the dialec tical inconsistency of moral theories, to which he refers to as “failure,” founds the ontological status of moral principles. Individual moral failure, on the other hand, is reduced to an epistemic error. Against the background of Lisa Tessman’s moral skepticism, Søren Kierkegaard’s moral existentialism, and Georg Simmel’s moral psy chologism, the author of this article shows that by overlooking the significance of in dividual moral failure, Steinmann’s “metaethical failure” loses its dialectical meaning.

Keywords

• failure
• metaethics
• moral theory
• moral dilemma
• dialectics
• michael steinmann
• lisa tessman
• søren kierkegaard
• georg simmel