PLoS Medicine (Jan 2022)
The impact of removing financial incentives and/or audit and feedback on chlamydia testing in general practice: A cluster randomised controlled trial (ACCEPt-able)
Abstract
Background Financial incentives and audit/feedback are widely used in primary care to influence clinician behaviour and increase quality of care. While observational data suggest a decline in quality when these interventions are stopped, their removal has not been evaluated in a randomised controlled trial (RCT), to our knowledge. This trial aimed to determine whether chlamydia testing in general practice is sustained when financial incentives and/or audit/feedback are removed. Methods and findings We undertook a 2 × 2 factorial cluster RCT in 60 general practices in 4 Australian states targeting 49,525 patients aged 16–29 years for annual chlamydia testing. Clinics were recruited between July 2014 and September 2015 and were followed for up to 2 years or until 31 December 2016. Clinics were eligible if they were in the intervention group of a previous cluster RCT where general practitioners (GPs) received financial incentives (AU$5–AU$8) for each chlamydia test and quarterly audit/feedback reports of their chlamydia testing rates. Clinics were randomised into 1 of 4 groups: incentives removed but audit/feedback retained (group A), audit/feedback removed but incentives retained (group B), both removed (group C), or both retained (group D). The primary outcome was the annual chlamydia testing rate among 16- to 29-year-old patients, where the numerator was the number who had at least 1 chlamydia test within 12 months and the denominator was the number who had at least 1 consultation during the same 12 months. We undertook a factorial analysis in which we investigated the effects of removal versus retention of incentives (groups A + C versus groups B + D) and the effects of removal versus retention of audit/feedback (group B + C versus groups A + D) separately. Of 60 clinics, 59 were randomised and 55 (91.7%) provided data (group A: 15 clinics, 11,196 patients; group B: 14, 11,944; group C: 13, 11,566; group D: 13, 14,819). Annual testing decreased from 20.2% to 11.7% (difference −8.8%; 95% CI −10.5% to −7.0%) in clinics with incentives removed and decreased from 20.6% to 14.3% (difference −7.1%; 95% CI −9.6% to −4.7%) where incentives were retained. The adjusted absolute difference in treatment effect was −0.9% (95% CI −3.5% to 1.7%; p = 0.2267). Annual testing decreased from 21.0% to 11.6% (difference −9.5%; 95% CI −11.7% to −7.4%) in clinics where audit/feedback was removed and decreased from 19.9% to 14.5% (difference −6.4%; 95% CI −8.6% to −4.2%) where audit/feedback was retained. The adjusted absolute difference in treatment effect was −2.6% (95% CI −5.4% to −0.1%; p = 0.0336). Study limitations included an unexpected reduction in testing across all groups impacting statistical power, loss of 4 clinics after randomisation, and inclusion of rural clinics only. Conclusions Audit/feedback is more effective than financial incentives of AU$5–AU$8 per chlamydia test at sustaining GP chlamydia testing practices over time in Australian general practice. Trial registration Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12614000595617 In a cluster randomized trial, Jane S Hocking and colleagues investigate the impact of removing financial incentives and/or audit and feedback on chlamydia testing in general practice in Australia. Author summary Why was this study done? Financial incentives and audit/feedback are widely used in primary care to influence clinician behaviour and increase quality of care. As healthcare costs continue to increase, governments and funding agencies are reassessing funding models for primary care, with widespread cuts to financial incentives. While observational data suggest a decline in quality when these interventions are stopped, their removal has not been evaluated in a randomised controlled trial (RCT). What did the researchers do and find? We conducted a 2 × 2 factorial cluster RCT in Australian general practices that aimed to determine the impact on chlamydia testing in general practice when incentive payments per activity and/or audit/feedback on activity performance were removed. Clinics were randomised into 1 of 4 groups: incentives removed but audit/feedback retained, audit/feedback removed but incentives retained, both removed, and both retained. The primary outcome was the annual chlamydia testing rate among 16- to 29-year-old patients. We found that removal of incentive payments had little impact on general practice chlamydia testing, but the removal of audit and feedback reduced testing. What do these results mean? Our payments were consistent with other incentives general practitioners (GPs) received at the time, suggesting that in the Australian general practice setting, incentive payments of this amount do not have a substantial impact on influencing GP preventive healthcare activities such as chlamydia testing. The removal of quarterly audit and feedback for GPs had a greater impact on testing rates, reflecting the importance of this strategy in influencing GP preventive healthcare activities. The provision of audit and feedback was costlier than the provision of financial incentives. However, using online video conferencing and fully automating the audit and feedback reports would reduce costs. Our results suggest that, in Australia at least, audit and feedback is more effective than incentive payments of AU$5 to AU$8 per activity at influencing GP behaviour.