Game Model of Green Financial Supply Chain Based on Government Subsidy Analysis

Abstract

Rural Revitalization is not only the necessary way to achieve common prosperity, but also an important strategy to promote China’s sustainable development. However, under the centralized administrative management system such as China, it is still lacking that the impact research of central fiscal policy on local government behavior and market behavior in the game theory. Therefore, This paper consider the existence of two local governments with different Rural Revitalization strategies and a channel structure composed of two manufacturers (township enterprises) and two retailers (E-commerce platforms). Each retailer sells only one manufacturer’s products, and the two manufacturers can choose different sales channels and financing modes. This paper analyzes the three-party four stage Stackelberg game among manufacturers, retailers and local governments under the same conditions of central government project subsidies. The study finds that township enterprises will choose online retail for product sales in the presence of consumer preferences. The central government’s project subsidy policy has a significant positive impact on both the product demand volume and the improvement of product greenness. Although, this policy is very important for the Rural Revitalization, under the lending mode of e-commerce platforms, government subsidies and excessively high loan interest rate of e-commerce platform will damage the utility of consumers and products greenness. Therefore, the combination of the central government’s project subsidy and the control of loan interest rate is the policy combination to realize the better development of township enterprises.

Keywords

• Government subsidies
• local government
• rural revitalization
• supply chain management
• Stackelberg model