General Three-Population Multi-Strategy Evolutionary Games for Long-Term On-Grid Bidding of Generation-Side Electricity Market

Abstract

Founded on bounded rationality and limited information, evolutionary game theory has been preliminarily applied in many fields, such as electricity market (EM). To address the complex behavioral decision-making issues in the more-common three-population multi-strategy evolutionary game (3PmSEG) scenarios in EM. This paper explores the long-term evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) characteristics of general 3PmSEG systems with the aim of systematically investigating the evolution process of long-term on-grid bidding of a generation-side EM based on these features. First, the long-term ESE characteristics of general three-population two-strategy and three-strategy evolutionary games are thoroughly investigated. Complete relative net payoff (RNP) parameters are defined for these games. Then, the modeling idea of general 3PmSEGs is elaborated. Research shows that the game can be guided to evolve toward an expected long-term ESE point by properly adjusting its RNP parameters. To verify this, finally, the long-term on-grid bidding of power generation is investigated for a tripartite generation-side EM. The case study reveals that effective government supervision can effectively promote new energy accommodation of the market. Overall, the models developed in this paper are relatively universal and practical, which can provide some theoretical and methodological references for complex evolutionary game issues in related fields.

Keywords

• Evolutionary game theory
• evolutionarily stable equilibrium
• relative net payoff
• long-term on-grid bidding
• generation-side electricity market