Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia (Jan 2012)
Unforgivable Sinners? Epistemological and Psychological Naturalism in Husserl’s Philosophy as a Rigorous Science
Abstract
In this paper I present and assess Husserl's arguments against epistomological and psychological naturalism in his essay Philosophy as a Rigorous Science. I show that his critique is directed against positions that are generally more extreme than most currently debated variants of naturalism. However, Husserl has interesting thoughts to contribute to philosophy today. First, he shows that there is an important connection between naturalism in epistemology (which in his view amounts to the position that the validity of logic can be reduced to the validity natural laws of thinking) and naturalism in psychology (which in his view amounts to the position that all psychic occurrences are merely parallel accompaniments of physiological occurrences.) Second, he shows that a strong version of epistemological naturalism is self-undermining and fails to translate the cogency of logic in psychological terms. Third, and most importantly for current debates, he attacks Cartesianism as a form of psychological naturalism because of its construal of the psyche as a substance. Against this position, Husserl defends the necessity to formulate new epistemic aims for the investigation of consciousness. He contends that what is most interesting about consciousness is not its empirical fact but its transcendental function of granting cognitive access to all kinds of objects (both empirical and ideal). The study of this function requires a specific method (eidetics) that cannot be conflated with empirical methods. I conclude that Husserl's analyses offer much-needed insight into the fabric of consciousness and compelling arguments against unwarranted metaphysical speculations about the relationship between mind and body.