Argumentum: Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric (Jul 2015)
Theoretical Models of Deliberative Democracy: A Critical Analysis
Abstract
Abstract: My paper focuses on presenting and analyzing some of the most important theoretical models of deliberative democracy and to emphasize their limits. Firstly, I will mention James Fishkin‟s account of deliberative democracy and its relations with other democratic models. He differentiates between four democratic theories: competitive democracy, elite deliberation, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. Each of these theories makes an explicit commitment to two of the following four “principles”: political equality, participation, deliberation, nontyranny. Deliberative democracy is committed to political equality and deliberation. Secondly, I will present Philip Pettit‟s view concerning the main constraints of deliberative democracy: the inclusion constraint, the judgmental constraint and the dialogical constraint. Thirdly, I will refer to Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson‟s conception regarding the “requirements” or characteristics of deliberative democracy: the reason-giving requirement, the accessibility of reasons, the binding character of the decisions and the dynamic nature of the deliberative process. Finally, I will discuss Joshua Cohen‟s “ideal deliberative procedure” which has the following features: it is free, reasoned, the parties are substantively equal and the procedure aims to arrive at rationally motivated consensus. After presenting these models I will provide a critical analysis of each one of them with the purpose of revealing their virtues and limits. I will make some suggestions in order to combine the virtues of these models, to transcend their limitations and to offer a more systematical account of deliberative democracy. In the next four sections I will take into consideration four main strategies for combining political and epistemic values (“optimistic”, “deliberative”, “democratic” and “pragmatic”) and the main objections they have to face. In the concluding section, I will argue that any theoretical model is confronted with the “the paradox of democratic deliberation”: the legitimacy of political decisions demands for the „raw‟ opinion of the citizens, while the epistemic rightness of political decisions demands for a „filtered‟ public opinion. And, I my opinion, this paradox reveals a deep inconsistency in the core of the deliberative model which suggest that the deliberative procedure should not be conceived as an authentic alternative to the classical theories of democratic legitimacy.
