Sunset Legislation als Instrument der besseren Rechtsetzung: Wunderwaffe oder stumpfes Schwert?

Abstract

In the context of the Better Regulation Agenda, an old acquaintance of regulatory reform and deregulation efforts from the 1970s and 1980s – Sunset Legislation – is discussed as one feasible instrument to ensure a systematic ex-post evaluation of regulations. Ideally, sunset or review clauses should force administration and political decision makers to regularly decide whether a particular regulation is necessary or not. Based on the empirical experiences with sunset and review clauses in four countries, namely the United States, Australia, Switzerland and Germany, the practical relevance of Sunset Legislation as an instrument for better regulation is discussed. To do so, we systematize which policy goals can be supported by using sunset clauses and what an appropriate use as well as a successful institutionalization of Sunset Legislation could look like.