The Normative Bases of Semi-Presidentialism: Max Weber and the Mitigation of Caesarism

Abstract

This article aims to locate the normative origins of the semi-presidential government in the theoretical contribution of German thinker Max Weber. I argue that Weberian reasoning about the Head of State, when freed from the German background in which it arose, may shed light on how semi-presidentialism can be justified in other national contexts nowadays. Methodologically, this work draws a link between Weber’s constitutional thought and part of the literature concerning forms of government, especially semi-presidentialism. I evaluate particularly whether it is possible to build a normative theory of the semi-presidential system from similar concerns raised by him, that is, goals of national strengthening, selection of political leaders, and a popularly elected presidency working as a check on congressional and bureaucratic particularism. My analysis suggests that Weber’s reasoning may be employed to defend a change to semi-presidentialism, provided the domestic powers of the popularly elected president be curtailed while her or his influence over foreign affairs is emphasized.

Keywords

• max weber
• forms of government
• semi-presidentialism