EMBODIED MIND. THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE OF SPACE IN GEORGE BERKELEY’S NEW THEORY OF VISION

Abstract

Berkeley is a philosopher commonly associated with his thesis about the non-existence of the material world. However, he would disagree with the statement that the entire world that, according to him, consists of ideas, is only in the cognizing mind. He would also disagree with the fact that perceived objects are in absolute space. The article aims to present Berkeley’s solution to the alternative mentioned above. The solution is based on the category of space presented in Berkeley’s Essasy Towards New Theory of Vision. In New Theory of Vision, Berkeley explains his position on problem of visual perception. He begins his argument by resolving the issue of the visual perception of distance, and this subjects leads him to much further matters — including the concept of relative space, grounded in the bodily experience of the cognizing subject.

Keywords

• george berkeley
• new theory of vision
• space
• immaterialism
• molyneux problem