Byzantium’s amphibious ways of war, 810-961

Abstract

The period 810-961 witnessed amphibious warfare’s central role in the resurgence of the Byzantine Empire. Tailored to Byzantium’s defensive strategic culture and resilient imperial institutions, the Byzantines relied upon multifarious types of amphibious ways of war: major expeditions, defensive operations, and raiding. Attempts to reconquer Crete from the Andalus-Arab Emirate frequently managed to deploy forces upon Crete but failed to re-establish Byzantine hegemony. This essay proposes that precise synchronization of leadership and logistics finally made possible the reconquest in 960-961. We assess the failed expeditions, Nikephoros Phokas’ triumph, and other amphibious actions (defensive as well as offensive). Military leadership stemmed from an aristocratic military elite as well as commanders of genius who understood the management of material capabilities. Another factor in Byzantium’s ways of war were successive incarnations of its marine troops. The latter fought not only major campaigns but excelled in limited actions that harnessed long distance force projection serving the Empire’s changing strategic position. In the course of our analysis we consider how traditional military history might come to terms with the unique nature of Byzantine primary sources, written and illustrated.