Argentina as an Extra Ally of the United States in NATO

Abstract

Few months ago, the United States of America and Argentina signed the agreements to become official allies. Although every alliance is a bilateral fact, it is obvious in this case that it was Argentina that approached the U.S. first and not vice-versa. How can it be explained that a peripheral country, with a long tradition of isolationism, and even confrontation with the Washington, came to be this northern neighbor’s ally? Such a decision was not improvised, rather it was the result of a prolonged process of readjustment in Argentina’s foreign policy. To begin to explain this readjustment, three distinct levels of analysis should be undertaken.The first, the broadest, refers to changes in the international system that affected the way Argentina conceived of its foreign policy. The end of bipolarity altered the equation of costs and benefits of Argentinean diplomacy, raising the costs of isolationism and increasing the incentives for a new bilateral relation with Washington. The second level is more demarcated and refers to the events which influenced Argentinean society and its leadership: the profound transformation of this country’s political culture. A series of values that were absolutely unpopular when the transition to democracy began had become, by the end of the decade, mute points in the process leading to a democratic consensus. The change in the political culture was decisive in the construction of the new foreign policy. The third level of analysis is the most specific: the ideas and leadership style of President Carlos Menem. Though the vision and ideas of this Peronist leader have been fundamental in the decision to establish closer relations with Washington, his decisions are not explicable without reference to the other variables mentioned above.