Superjudges and the Separation of Powers: A Case Study of Judicial Informality in Czechia

Abstract

Examining the practices of i) the selection of judges, ii) panel composition and case assignment, and iii) judicial off-bench activities, the article argues that some Czech judges, most often court presidents and apex court judges, use informal judicial institutions as tools to increase their influence on judicial administration and the decision-making of courts. As a result, these judges have far greater influence than the formal account of their roles might suggest. The article explores the context which facilitated the informal rise of these “Superjudges”, asserting that the key factors were institutionally independent judiciaries with individually dependent judges, the absence of a shared understanding of fundamental constitutional concepts, and the underperformance of Czech legal academia. The article then contends that while Superjudges may contribute to an informed, effective, and politically independent functioning of the judiciary, they also risk eroding important divisions of power which, in turn, might compromise the integrity of the judicial process, undermine the authority of courts, and disconnect the content of the law from the general interest.

Keywords

• Superjudges
• separation of powers
• judicial informality
• Czechia
• judicial administration