Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (Aug 2015)

A Departure from a Formalistic Approach in the Assessment of Restrictive Vertical Agreements in Favour of a More EconomicsBased Approach? Case Comment to the Supreme Court Judgment of 15 May 2014 (Ref. No. III SK 44/13)

  • Małgorzata Sieradzka

Journal volume & issue
Vol. 8, no. 11
pp. 269 – 276

Abstract

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The discussed judgment of the Supreme Court is in line with its other jurisprudence with respect to the classification of price agreements as practices restricting competition under Article 6(1)(1) of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act1 of 16 February 2007 (hereafter: Competition Act 2007). Despite the firm stance taken on the assessment of price agreements by the UOKiK President, the Supreme Court once again emphasizes the necessity for an economics-based approach2. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, not every vertical price-fixing agreement results in a threat to the public interest. A departure from a rigorous application of the ban on competition restricting practices (Article 6(1)(1) of Competition Act 2007) to all types of vertical agreements has an impact on the application of legal provisions governing the imposition of financial penalties. Considering the optional nature of fines, the question arises about their purpose in cases where the public interest has not been jeopardized.

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