Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the non-acquisitiveness of “Conceptions” and “Assents”

Abstract

According to the orthodox view in Aristotelian tradition concerning the division of knowledge (ʿilm), some knowledge in the form of conception (taṣawwur) and assent (taṣdīq) is attainable (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). The attainable knowledge is divided into primitive and theoretical. Regarding primitive knowledge, concerning “the conception”, knowing the language and noticing the word is enough to understand it without asking anyone and concerning “the assent”, the assertion of which its ingredients are already known is primitive and hence non-acquisitive if the knower immediately without any investigation finds its truth-value. On the other hand, acquisitive knowledge is the knowledge about which the above conditions are not enough and the thinker should make some effort to obtain it, hence it is theoretical. However, according to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, all “conceptions” and all “assents”, are non-acquisitive although they may be divided into primitive and theoretical. His view leads to the conclusion that all sciences are non-acquisitive. Ṭūsī is the most famous critic of Rāzī. In this paper, first, I have examined Rāzī’s views and arguments and Ṭūsī’s criticisms. Secondly, I have suggested that Rāzī’s view is rooted in his theological viewpoint, which is coherent with Ashʿarite doctrine.

Keywords

• fak hr al- rāzī
• ṭūsī
• conception
• assent
• non-acquisitive knowledge
• ashʻarites