RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC EXIGENCY IN “POSTDEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM”: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF THE EURO CRISIS

Abstract

The author analyzes EU’s response to the ongoing economic crisis, focusing on the problem of legislative and institutional fragmentation. She argues that the authoritarian crisis management – fueled by “crisis” discourse - subverted democratic accountability by its reliance on executive discretion and intergovernmentalism. Through an analysis of European Court of Justice’s case law as well as a close look at the exact workings and implications of European Central Bank’s ultra vires actions, she shows how Lisbon Treaty was sacrificed to the exigency of creating an Ersatz Union law more pliable to the immediate concerns of reforming the EMU. She holds that the intergovernmental instruments not only “unconstitutionally” requisitioned the involvement of EU institutions, but also established a political administration unresponsive to democratic accountability, damaging the legitimacy of the Union. The resulting subjugation of the political and social constitution to economic conditions threatens an abdication of law and undermines the integrity of the Union legal order.

Keywords

• EU
• economic crisis
• rule of law
• executive federalism
• intergovernmentalism