The effect of managerial overconfidence on the conservatism with respect to the role of external monitoring

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of managerial overconfidence on both conditional and unconditional conservatism considering the role of external monitoring. Data is collected from a sample of 197 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2004 to 2012. Two measures are used for managerial overconfidence: excess asset growth and debt to equity ratio above the industry median. Unconditional conservatism is measured using an accrual-based measure and the difference between cash flow skewness and earnings skewness (Givoly and Hayn [2000]). Conditional conservatism is measured using Basu’s [1997] asymmetric timeliness measure. The findings indicate that both of managerial overconfidence measures have a significant negative effect on both conditional and unconditional conservatism. In addition, the results indicate that external monitoring significantly mitigates the effect of managerial overconfidence on unconditional conservatism.

Keywords

• conditional conservatism
• External Monitoring
• managerial overconfidence
• unconditional conservatism