A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Adoption of Patient-Generated Health Data

Abstract

Patient-generated health data (PGHD) have great potential to improve clinical outcomes. As providers consider whether and how to incorporate PGHD into their clinical workflows, platforms by Apple and Amazon stand to fundamentally alter the landscape. With the aim to examine the conditions under which providers would adopt PGHD and possibly sign on with a platform, we analyzed the incentives and optimal strategies of two healthcare providers, a monopoly platform, and consumers using stylized game-theoretic models and solve for potential equilibria. We found that consumer surplus always increased with PGHD adoption, but social welfare may drop. The larger provider had more incentive to adopt PGHD than the smaller provider, but these incentives were reversed in the case of platform adoption. Accordingly, the platform enrolled the smaller provider first and possibly both providers. The emergence of the platform raised provider surplus, potentially at the expense of the consumers, despite offering its service to them for free. These results illustrate the importance of economic incentives regarding whether and how PGHD could be incorporated into our current healthcare system.

Keywords

• patient-generated health data
• wearables
• platform adoption
• game theory
• social welfare